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I. Introduction
Participants in the subprime residential mortgage market never en
visioned widespread default} and lenders and investors in that market
did not foresee the risk involved with subprime loans. 2 The subprime mar
ket enjoyed significant growth from 2000 to 2006, increasing from 6 per
cent of all mortgage loan originations to 25 percent in 2006. 0 As the market
grew, originators eased underwriting standards, began writing more loans
with adjustable rates, accepted lower or no down payments, and stopped
requiring documentation of borrower incomes. 4 Originators of subprime
mortgages learned that the sale and securitization of those loans resulted
in a quick return of capital and permitted them to make more loans while
avoiding the consequences of their underwriting practices. 5 Because un
derwriting standards were loose and home prices were escalating, most
subprime borrowers who encountered financial difficulty before 2007 re
lied upon escalating housing prices and easily available credit to refinance
their way out of troubie. 6 Loan originators ""'ho pooled and sold their loans
to investors had little incentive to ensure that borrowers could actually af
ford them. 7
In early 2007, investors and lenders began to see the results of lax under
writing standards when delinquency rates for subprime loans originated in
2006 greatly exceeded the rates for those loans underwritten before 2005.a
Lenders responded by tightening credit standards. 9 Private mortgage in
surers also tightened underwriting standards, making mortgages even
harder to get. 10 As underwriting criteria tightened, many subprime bor
rowers found that they could not refinance their mortgages. 11
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Lax underwriting, followed by tightened credit standards and declining
home values, have contributed to rapidly escalating rates of foreclosure.
The number of foreclosure filings skyrocketed in the first quarter of 2008,
when approximately 550,000 homes began the foreclosure process-more
than double the average quarterly rate in earlier years. 12 In 2008, an esti
mated three million loans are predicted to default. This is a sharp increase
from 2007 and 2006 when one and a half million and one million loans were
in default, respectively. 13
Nationally, housing prices have declined 16 percent from their high in
the spring of 2006. 14 Even greater drops in value have been seen in some
areas, such as Sacramento, California, where median home prices have
reportedly fallen 34 percent in the last year. 15 Additional declines of 10 per
cent to 15 percent from the fall of 2008 to mid-2009 are predicted. 16 Those
declines have resulted in an estimated 12 million homeowners owing
more on their mortgage than their home is worth, a significant increase
from 4.1 million homeowners in 2007. 17
The rising numbers of foreclosures and the decline in housing values
have resulted in a variety of proposed legislative fixes, ranging from state
moratoriums on foreclosure filings to permission for bankruptcy court
judges to write down principal balances on debtors' loans. None of the
measures gained significant momentum until July 26, 2008, when the Sen
ate passed amended bill H.R. 3221, the Housing and Economic Recovery
Act of 2008 (HERA). The president signed the bill on July 30, 2008.
HERA includes several sections intended to reduce the rising tide of
foreclosures. It modernizes the Federal Housing Administration's (FHA)
operations; 18 establishes the HOPE for Homeowners Program (HOPE pro
gram), which will provide federal insurance when lenders voluntarily write
down the principal balance owed on mortgages; and amends the Truth in
Lending Act to insulate some servicers from potential litigation risk if they
agree to modify principal amounts due on mortgage loans under the HOPE
program. 19
The purpose of this article is to describe key provisions of the HOPE
program and examine the likelihood that it will indeed reduce foreclosures
and stabilize the mortgage market over the three years during which the
program is effective.
II. HOPE Program
Title IV of HERA, which is entitled "HOPE for Homeowners Act of
2008," amends Title II of the National Housing Act. 20 Its purpose is to assist
homeowners in avoiding foreclosrnes, support long-term sustainable home
ownership, stabilize and provide confidence in the mortgage markets,
and provide "servicers of delinquent mortgages with additional methods
and approaches to avoid foreclosure." 21 The HOPE program, as it was en
acted, sought to accomplish those purposes tluough a voluntary program
in which the first mortgage is modified or refinanced and the principal
balance is reduced to no more than 90 percent of the market value of the
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property it secures. 22 In return, the first mortgage lienholder is eligible for
FHA insurance on the reduced principal amount, which in effect insulates
the lienholder from future declines in housing prices or risk of loss through
foreclosure. The HOPE program faces many obstacles that stem from
HERA's voluntary nature and from the securitization of many of the resi
dential mortgages that might be eligible for participation in the program.
On October 3, 2008, the HOPE program was amended by the Emergency
Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 (EESA), in an effort to broaden the
program's reach.2-'
Unfortunately, the I-IOPE program is not likely to have a significant ef
fect on the rising number of foreclosures or in ::.tabilizing the mortgage mar
ket. HERA limits the Fl-{ A's authority to insure mortgages under the HOPE
program to a total aggregate principal amount of $300 billion of mortgages
during the period beginning October 1, 2008, and ending September 31,
2011 .n The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates that only 400,0D()
borrovvers will refinance under the !-!OPE program. 25 (-:;iven the current
rates of default, a predicted three million in 2008 alone, the HOPE pro
gram could help only a fraction of the homeowners who default before the
program ends in 2011. 16 The sheer number of anticipated defaults and the
increasing numbers of people who owe more on their mortgages than
the value of their homes will make it difficult for the HOPE program to stabi
lize housing prices or significantly reduce the number of foreclosures. Unfor
tunately, even more barriers to success exist. Each will be discussed in detail
after a brief review of the! !OPE program's requirements and function.
To participate in the HOPE program, a borrower
1. must not be intentionally in default,2 7
2. must not have provided false information to obtain a mortgage that is
eligible for the HOPE program,28
3. as of March 1, 2008, must have had or thereafter is likely to have, due
to the terms of the mortgage being reset, a mortgage debt-to-income
ratio greater than 31 percent,'-9
4. must not be able to afford his or her mortgage payments,-m
5. must have entered into the mortgage on or before January 1, 2008,"' 1
and
6. must only have an ownership interest in one residence that is the bor
rower's principal residence and secures the mortgage debt.' 2
The I !OPE program severely restricts the provisions that may be in
cluded in loans insured by the program. 33 Loans must have terms of at
least thirty years, YI may not exceed the reasonable ability of the borrower to
make payments, 30 and must have a fixed interest rate. 36 Initially, the HOPE
program required the principal balance of the loan to be no more than
90 percent of the market value of the property but that provision was
amended to permit a higher percentage. 37 Lenders are permitted to charge
a 1 percent origination fee. 38 Interest rates, although required to be fixed,
are to be commensurate with the market rate for comparable loans. 39 The
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existing senior lender/servicer must agree to waive all penalties for pre
payment or refinancing and any fees and penalties relating to default or
delinquency 40 and release its lien on the property in return for receiving the
proceeds from the program mortgage. Finally, all subordinate lienholders
must agree to have their interest extinguished upon refinancing with the
program. 41
In return for a future equity position, borrowers must agree tu share
that equity, as well as any appreciation in their home, with the FHA. 42 Spe
cifically, borrowers must share any equity created by the 1-fOPE program
if they sell or refinance their home. After the first year of the loan, 90 per
cent of any equity created by sale or refinancing belongs to the rHA, and
10 percent belongs to the borrower. This declines to a shared equity in the
fifth year and thereafter. 4 ~ Borrowers must also equally share with the Fl-IA,
upon sale or disposition, the appreciation in their home that occurred after
the date the mortgage was insured under the !-!OPE program. 41 ff a sec
ond lienholder had an interest extinguished during the refinancing, that
secondary lienholdcr may also share in the appreciation of the property or
receive a cash payout instead.'·'
In addition to forgiving a portion of the principal amount due, the ex
isting lienhulder must also pay the initial 3 percent FHA insurance pre
mium on the new HOPE loan.' 6 for the life of the loan, borrowers must
continue to pay an additional 1.5 percent annual premium based on the
remaining principal balance of the mortgage. 47 Because the FHA insures
the entire balilnce of the new principal amount, in effect, the lienholder is
insulated from further market risk if home prices go down and foreclo
sure results. Borrowers also agree not lo get a second mortgage on their
home during the first five years of the mortgage, except those loans that
ensure that the property meets maintenance standards. 40 Second liens re
lated to property maintenance may be permitted only if the loan does not
reduce the value of the government's equity, and if the total of the second
loan combined with the first mortgage docs not exceed 95 percent of the
home's value.'·~
The HOPE legislation gives the program's board of directors'i(} the ability
to "establish requirements and standards for the program" and prescribe
such regulations and ... guidance as may be necessary or appropriate to im
plement such requirements and standards." 51 The HOPE board issued mies
establishing the core requirements for the program on October 6, 2008. 0' The
rules took effect without a public comment period upon their publication in
the Federal Register and will be codified at 24 C.F.R. Part 4001.
The 1-IOPE program is voluntary. Neither first mortgage holders nor
subordinate lienholders are required to participate. Lienholders that be
lieve that they will benefit from reducing the principal balance of the mort
gage rather than foreclosing will participate. Because many mortgage loans
are sold by their originators and securitized, entities servicing those loans
for the investors that own them will have to determine if loan modifica
tions under the HOPE program are in the best interest of those investors. 53
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To encourage mortgage servicers to participate, HERA also amended the
Truth in Lending Act 54 by adding a new section that defines the fiduciary
duty of a servicer for a pooled residential mortgage where the duty is not
established by contract with the servicer.ss
III. Obstacles to Success
The HOPE program faces substantial barriers to accomplishing its goals,
including the program's voluntary nature, the number of loans that have
been securitized, and the role of the servicer with securitized mortgage
pools. CBO estimates that nine million homeowners with outstanding sub
prime and Alt-A loans could qualify for the HOPE program.% Out of those
nine million, CBO estimates that the HOPE program will only assist an
estimated 400,000 borrowers and a recent FHA estimate predicts that only
13,300 borrowers will be assisted in the first year of the HOPE program. 57
Because participation in the HOPE program is voluntary, all participants
must determine that they can derive a benefit from the program before con
senting to participate. The borrower, the lienholder (or the loan servicer on
behalf of the lienholder), and subordinate lienholders must also agree upon
the terms of their participation. Each of these parties has unique issues and
circumstances that will affect the decision, as discussed below.

A. Borrowers May Not Be Eligible or Willing to Participate
Borrowers (and their lenders) may not initially know if they are eligible
for the HOPE program. The legislation contains requirements for borrower
eligibility, but one of the requirements needs further clarification-despite
publication of further guidance and rules. 58 The program requires borrowers
to certify that they have not intentionally defaulted on a mortgage eligible
for the HOPE program (or any other debt). HERA criminalizes a willful false
statement concerning that matter. The program regulations define inten
tional default as when (1) a borrower knowingly failed to make payment on
the mortgage or debt, (2) a borrower had available funds at the time payment
was due that could have paid the mortgage or debt without undue hardship,
and (3) the debt was not the subject of a bona fide dispute. 59 Because undue
hardship is not defined and a numerical standard such as a total debt to
gross income ratio is not employed, borrowers (and lenders) may not be sure
when an intentional and disqualifying default has occurred. Have borrowers
intentionally defaulted because they chose to pay private school tuition for
their children instead of the mortgage? What about health insurance? A lux
ury car payment? A contribution to a 401(k) plan? A credit card payment in
excess of the monthly minimum?
Even if a mortgage holder or servicer determines that the borrower is
eligible to participate in the HOPE program, the delinquent borrower may
be difficult to find. Servicers report that they engage in a variety of tactics
to get borrowers to return phone calls, including sending free cell phones
to borrowers to encourage them to call back.6(1 More than half of borrowers
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in foreclosure proceedings have no contact with their lender. 61 One lender
reported that it attempted to help 300 seriously delinquent homeown

ers avoid foreclosure, but only thirty-eight responded. 62 Unfortunately,
although approximately 20 percent of homeowners believe that nothing
will happen after missing three or more payments,63 interest rates charged
under the HOPE program may become unaffordable after repeated months
of default cause further damage to a borrower's credit score.
Even if borrowers are eligible for the program and engaged in discus
sions with their lenders, will they understand and be able to assess whether
the HOPE program provides a better alternative to foreclosure for them?
Although borrowers receive a future equity position in their home, the cost
of participating in the HOPE program is significant. Participation requires
that borrowers not only accept the loss of value in their home but also un
derstand that any future appreciation in value must be shared equally with
FHA when the property is sold. 64 Borrowers must also pay market rate inter
est, a one percent origination fee, and an annual premium of 1.5 percent for
FHA insurance. The FHA has already acknowledged that HOPE loans will
have higher interest rates because of the distressed nature of the borrowers
entering the HOPE program. Higher interest rates will adversely affect the
affordability of HOPE loans. 65 Some borrowers may decide that the program
is too expensive and choose to walk away from their current home after
purchasing a smaller, less expensive home. 66
Understandably, default rates clearly depend on the amount of equity
homeowners have in their home. 67 Given that borrowers in the HOPE
program will initially have no equity, a substantial number of partici
pants in the HOPE program may end up in default. One study found
that a significant number of borrowers, approximately 40 percent, who
entered into a forbearance agreement or modification re-defaulted within
one year. 68 Other industry participants have pegged re-default rates at 30
percent to 45 percent. 69 One rating agency found that 20 percent of loans
that had been modified in 2006 had re-defaulted in the first six months
of 2007. 7° CBO has predicted that about one-third of the HOPE program
loans will end in default. 71 The FHA acknowledges that developing work
able underwriting standards for distressed borrowers is challenging and
that while more lenient standards will increase participation in the HOPE
program, more lenient standards will also result in higher defaults. 72
Both regulators and industry participants agree that re-defaults are less
likely if loan modifications result in loans that are truly affordable for
borrowers. 73

B. Securitization and Loan Servicers May Block Participation
The majority of subprime mortgage loans are securitized and serviced by
entities that did not originate the loan. 7' Servicers typically collect mortgage
payments and pay them to the investor or lender that holds the mortgage,
manage escrow funds for taxes and insurance, and engage in collection
and loss mitigation efforts when borrowers default. For more than a year
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before the creation of the HOPE program, servicers had been encouraged
to engage in appropriate loan modifications to ensure long-term afford
ability for borrowers. 7 ' Nevertheless, servicers failed to modify loans. 76
According to a September 2007 survey conducted by Moody's Investment
Services, sixteen servicers representing 80 percent of the subprime market
had modified only 1 percent of loans that experienced interest rate resets in
early 2007.,-; Servicers rely heavily on repayment plans 7~ instead of modifi
cations to assist borrowers in trouble.n Servicers also arc relying on extend
ing the initial interest rate on adjustable rate mortgage::. (ARMs) for up to
five years. 80 Unfortunately, the effectiveness of techniques such as repay
ment or forbearance agreements is decreasing. 81
A brief explanation of the securitization process is necessary to under
stand the important role that servicers play in determining whether a will
ing and eligible borrower can participate in the HOPE program. Before
securitization became prevalent, most borrowers dealt with lenders that
originated their own loans and held them on their books as assets until
maturity. Lenders that held those loans were careful to use appropriate un
derwriting standards to minimize their risk. As the subprime market gre>v,
originators of subprime mortgages quickly learned that ::.ale and securitiLa
tion of those loans resulted in a quick return of capital, permitting them to
make even more loans and escape the consequences of lax underwriting. 82
Generally, subprime mortgage originators 1nade loans and transferred those
loans to a separate third party. l"he third parties combined those loans into
a large pool and sold to investors the rights to receive payments due under
the mortgages making up the pool. The process of pooling those mortgages
and selling interests in the payments due is known as securitization.
Sccuritization converts individual mortgages (and the rights to receive
payments on those mortgages) into mortgage-backed securities. Usually,
the entity securihzing the loan tries to isolate the loans from the lender or
originator in order to protect investors if the lender or originator files for
bankruptcy. This is done by selling the loans to a special purpose vehicle
(SPV) that is separate from the lender or originator. Such a sale also erects
a barrier to borrowers seeking to pursue claims of inappropriate lending
practices because the purchasers may become "holders in due course" and
thus immune to suit.SJ The loans are then transferred to another SPV, usu
ally a trust, that ultimately holds the loans and is the issuer of the mortgage
backed securities.
The issuer, with the help of an investment bank, divides different pay
ment streams from the mortgages into different types of securities with
different risks. The different types of securities are called tranches. The in
vestment bank usually determines the structure of the tranches by deter
mining what attributes will appeal to investors."' 111.e most senior tranches
arc securities with the least risk and usually are paid first. The lowest tranche
usually has the most risk and is the first group of investors to experience
losses. Some of the tranches may receive interest payments, and some may
receive principal payments. Some tranches might be structured to receive
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prepayment penalties. 80 The trust that holds the loans is ultimately respon
sible for collecting moneys due from the mortgages and distributing those
funds to the investors. l'he trust that owns the loans usually has no em
ployees and instead retains servicers tu collect interest, principal, and fees
and to engage in loss mitigation efforts. Some pools may have one or more
entities engaged in servicing the loans. Fur example, some trustees engage
a master servicer who will then engage a servicer who may, in turn, engage
subservicers.
Securitization directly impacts the ability of borrowers to have their loans
modified or refinanced under the HOPE program. Only approved FHA lend
ers \vho volunteer for the HOPE program may originate HOPE loans.so The
special purpose vehicles that ov.'n securitized mortgages as well as many of
their servicers do not have origination capability and are not approved Fl-!A
lendcrs. 07 If those servicers want defaulting borrowers to participate in the
HOPE program, they will have to rely upon FHA-approved lenders to assist
those borrowers and originate the l-{OPE loans.
Even if a servicer has origination capability through an approved FHA
lender participating in the program, the ability of borrowers to participate
in the HOPE program can be affected in other ways. First, servicing agree
ments contain clauses that limit the ability of the servicer to enter into loan
modifications. 88 Second, because loan modifications can result in a reduc
tion of the interest rate, principal, or term, they may result in a benefit to
one investor and a loss to another, thereby exposing the servicer to claims
of breach of contract and fiduciary duty. 8" Third, according to industry re
ports, serviccrs are simply ovelVllhelmed with the number of defaults and
do not have the specially trained staff to modify loans. Finally, the current
structure of servicer compensation makes it unlikely that servicers wil! en
gage in large numbers of loan modifications under the J-{OPE program.
Because loan modifications have a potentially significant impart on invest
ment performance, servicing agreements contain clauses that limit the abil
ity of the servicer to enter into loan modifications.'Xl An estimated one-third
of loan pool::. restrict the number of loans that may be modified?' A typical
threshold is 5 percent of the pool. 92 Some pools do not permit any modifi
cations.'3 Other pools limit the ability to extend the term of the underlying
Joans. 94 Some securitization deals give investors the right to demand that
borrowt>rs go to foreclosure if their interest will be extinguished through a
modification.% The servicing agreement may also require the servicer to wait
until the borrower is thirty or more days delinquent before it can modify the
loan. 96 Still other servicing agreements require the loan to be either in default
or reasonably foreseeable to default before a modification may be made. 97
Even if the servicing agreement contains no specific limitation on loan
modifications, the language regarding the servicer's ability to modify
loans may be so vague that servicers are unlikely to test the limits of their
authority. 98 Many servicing agreements contain language requiring the ser
vicer to perform its obligations in the best interest of the investors or in the
same manner that the servicer would service its own loans. 99 Unfortunately,
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there is no recognized method or process for gaining investor approval for
amendment of the servicing agreement; and even if such a process existed,
not all investors would agree.
Servicers are also unlikely to engage in substantial modifications or ac
cept proceeds of a HOPE program refinance and release their liens because
investors may second-guess whether such actions resulted in a benefit to
a particular investor or tranche or to the pool as a whole. 100 Servicers may
also be second-guessed because of potential conflicts of interest that arise if
they have a residual ownership interest in the pool. 101 Because the structure
and characteristics of each tranche's interest are based upon the original
terms of the loans in the pool, trustees and servicers have limited discre
tion to modify the terms of individual loans within a pool when faced
with borrowers either in default or about to default. Each modification of
a loan may result in an increase in income to one investor and a decrease
to another. This requires a trustee to decide which tranche should receive
more money, a decision that leaves the trustee exposed to litigation. 1o:z
A loan modification that reduces income to investors may also result in
litigation. 103 Waiving a prepayment penalty when a loan is refinanced may
also result in litigation by investors.
In an unstable housing market, it may be difficult to determine which
option will result in higher recovery for investors. 104 Some servicers may re
sort to the safest course, i.e., foreclosure or forbearance plans, which, when
unsuccessful, ultimately result in foreclosure. 105 In an effort to address these
types of concerns, various industry participants have issued loan modifica
tion guidelines that focus on determining that the net present value of the
payments on the modified loan is likely to be greater than the anticipated
recovery from foreclosure. 1 Some lenders believe that a payment with
similar affordability may be achieved through interest rate reductions and
term extensions. Because a similar affordable payment could be achieved
without a reduction in principal, the lender/investor would retain the op
portunity to share in the appreciation when values rebound. 107
The capacity of servicers to engage in loan modifications is also an
issue. 108 Increasing defaults expand the workload of servicers, and the
rapid rate at which the defaults have occurred has contributed to those
capacity problems. 109 In fact, servicers are having difficulty hiring skilled
staff and finding outside vendors to assist. 110 Some servicers have had to
increase their collection and loss mitigation staff by anywhere from 200 per
cent to 500 percent. 111 Because all servicers are facing a simultaneous need
for larger capacity, their inability to engage in loan modifications is read
ily apparent. The Foreclosure Prevention Working Group, a group of state
officials, believes that loss mitigation departments are overwhelmed and
reported in April 2008 that seven out of ten delinquent borrowers were not
in line to receive any kind of loan modification.u 2
Finally, servicing agreements provide a financial disincentive for
servicers to engage in loan modifications that are estimated to cost be
tween $500 and $1,0DO per loan, a cost that servicers must bear. 113 Servicers
(1(;
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also rely upon earning other fees that are directly impacted by the HOPE
program. Most servicing agreements provide for a servicing fee calculated
as a percentage of the unpaid principal balance. For prime loans, the fee is
typically twenty-five basis points. For subprirne pools, the servicing fee is
typically fifty basis points. 114 Because the HOPE program requires the prin
cipal balance of the loan to be reduced to 90 percent of the market value, the
program provides a disincentive because it lowers servicers' revenues. The
HOPE program also requires fees relating to defaults, including late charges,
to be waived. 115 Most servicing agreements typically provide that fees relat
ing to late payments and defaults may be retained by the servicer. 116
The HOPE program's impact on servicer behavior will likely be mini
mal. Securitization requires that servicers act in the best interests of the in
vestors.ll7 Financial survival requires that servicers earn profits. The HOPE
program does not provide any financial incentives to servicers. Because an
estimated 70 percent to 75 percent of outstanding first lien mortgages have
been securitized,118 it is wtlikely that many of those loans will be modified
or refinanced under the HOPE program.

C. Second Lienholders Are Likely to Block Participation
The HOPE program requires all subordinate liens to be extinguished as a
condition of participation in the program. CBO estimates that 40 percent of
all subprime and Alt-A loans have second liens. 119 It is very unlikely that bor
rowers with second liens will be able to participate in the HOPE program.
Subordinate lienholders may refuse to extinguish their liens, a prerequisite
for participation in the program, believing that the borrower's ability to
make payments or the value of the home will be greater in the future. 120
Although second lienholders might be persuaded to accept loan modifica
tions outside of the HOPE program that preserve their interest, they are not
likely to participate in a program that requires that their liens be released.
Although subordinate lienholders owed more than $2,500 participating in
the HOPE program may receive a share of future appreciation or a cash
payout, lienholders owed less receive nothing under the program. 121 The
amount of the shared appreciation, 9 or 12 percent of future appreciation
at a future date not yet determined, may not be enough to persuade junior
lienholders to waive their interests. 122 Neither the EESA or the regulations
provide guidance on what the payments in lieu of a shared appreciation
interest should be. If second (and first) lienholders perceive that foreclosure
is imminent, participation may be more likely. 123 If those second liens are se
curitized, for the same reasons discussed above, participation is unlikely.
D. Additional Issues
The HOPE program presents additional issues other than those arising
from securitization and lack of voluntary participation. One of those
issues arises from the wrong kind of participation by lenders, i.e., adverse
selection. More than one regulator has expressed concern that lenders
may choose those loans that are the least likely to succeed for the HOPE
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program. 121 Lenders engaging in adverse selection might willingly write
down the principal balance of a loan that is not likely to succeed in return
for receiving a loan that is fully federally insured against default. 125 The
HOPE program legi'slation directed the HOPE board to establish standards
and policies to protect against adverse selection. 126 The legislation does not
provide guidance as to what those standards should be other than stating
that higher-risk loans may have to "demonstrate payment performance for
a reasonable period of time prior to being insured Wlder the program." 127
Regulations adopted for the program have interpreted that legislative di
rective to require that the borrower make one payment within 120 days
after the closing of the program mortgage. 128 The payment may not be
made by the lender or escrowed at closing.
Finally, permitting subordinate lienholders to participate in fuhtre ap
preciation with the FHA but not pennitting existing senior mortgage
holders to share in that appreciation will limit participation in the HOPE
program. Senior mortgage lenders and servicers that can avoid a principal
writedown and achieve affordable payments through interest rate reduc
tions and term extensions have little incentive to participate. 129
IV. Conclusion

The HOPE program is too little, too late for the many homeowners who
faced foreclosure last year and the three million homeowners who are pre
dicted to default this year. Given the significant barriers to success, it is Wl
likely that the program will prevent a significant number of foreclosures or
that it will stabilize the mortgage market. Providing help to 400,000 home
owners is simply not enough, given the magnitude of the problem. The
housing market is plagued by 12 million homeowners who owe more than
their homes are worth. The problem is compounded by the record number
of defaults resulting in foreclosrnes that lead to even further declines in
home values. More comprehensive legislative solutions are sorely needed,
and those solutions need to address the current market conditions and the
lack of regulation that led to them.
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31 percent mortgage debt-to-income ratio as of March I, 2008.

40

Journal of Affordable Housing

Volume 18, Number 1

Fall 2008
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47. I-IERA § 1402, National Housing Act§ 257(i)(2).
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plete list of prohibitions and requirements.
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59. 24 C.F.R. § 4001.07.
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65. Brian D. Montgomery, CQ CONG.TESTIMONY, Sept. 17, 2008.
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A Review of the Literature, 3:2 J. HOUSING RES. 341 (1992), available at www.
fanniemaefoundation.org/ programs/ jhrI pdf I jhr_0302_quercia.pd f.
68. FITCH RATINGS, U.S. RESIDENTIAL MORTGAGE SPECIAL REPORT: CHANC
ING Loss MITIGATION STRATEGIES FOR U.S. RMBS (June 4, 2007). The Fitch Re
port states that servicers have reported a re-default rate on loan modifications
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in the 35 percent to 40 percent range, whlch the report acknowledges is based
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69. Ted Cornwell, Experts Say High Re-Default Rates Inevitable, NAT'L MORT
GAGE NEWS, Apr. 21, 2008, at 3.
70. Mary McGarity, A Tough Test, MORTGAGE BANKING, May 1, 2008, at 28.
71. CoNC. BUDGET OFFICE, supra note 25, at 10.
72. Montgomery, supra note 65.
73. Greg Zeeman, chief servicing officer of HSBC Consumer & Mortgage
Lending, stated in a speech at SourceMedia's Second Annual Mortgage Servic
ing Conference that consumers receiving substantial relief are more likely to
keep paying their modified loans than consumers with more modest modifica
tions. Cornwell, supra note 69. Federal Reserve Board Chairman Ben Bernanke
stated that a write-down that is sufficient will remove the risk to investors of
additional write-downs as well as the risk of re-default.
74. FED. RESERVE BANK OF S.F., supra note 3, at 10.
75. FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair urged the industry to engage in automatic
modifications for borrowers with resetting ARMs in June 2007. In April 2007,
federal regulatory agencies issued a document entitled Statement on Working
with Mortgage Borrowers, which was also intended to encourage loan modifica
tions. In October 2007, a group of banks, servicers, and industry participants,
at the urging of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
and the Department of the Treasury, formed the HOPE NOW Alliance. The
alliance's initial mission was to explore methods of reaching at-risk borrow
ers, to improve conununications between nonprofit housing counselors and
servicers, and to consult with investors who own mortgages to enable coun
seling to be funded through servicing contracts. Press Release, HOPE NOW
Alliance Created to Help Distressed Homeowners (Oct. 10, 2007), available
at www.fsround.org/hope_now /pdfs/AllianceRelease.pdf. As of July 2008,
the HOPE Now Alliance reported that its servicers had completed approxi
mately 686,000 loan modifications and 1.38 million repayment plans in the
prior year. See www.hopenow.com/upload/data/files/HOPE0/o20NOW 0/o
20Loss 0/o20Mitigation"lo20National 0/o20Data 0/o20July07°/o20to%20July08.pdf.
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DCC Cites Flaws in Previous Counts; OTS Report to Follow, AM. BANKER, June 12,
2008, at 1.
76. Loan modifications are permanent changes to the interest rate, the prin
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TIONS (Sept. 21, 2007), available al www.moodys.com. An update of that survey
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to 3.5 percent.
78. Repayment plans are not usually restricted by servicing agreements. Kate
Berry, The Trouble with Loan Repayment Agreements, AM. BANKER, Jan. 9, 2008, at 1.
Some servicing agreements place a limit on the time that a repayment plan may
be in place.
79. Repayment plans have borrowers pay more each month to make up
for prior defaults. Tara Twomey, Foreclosure Prevention, CQ CONG.TESTIMONY,
Apr. 16, 2008.
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80. McGarity, supra note 70.
81. FITCH RATJNGS, supra note 68, at 6. Som1C industry participants b1Clieve
that the use of repayment plans has kept default rates artificially lov• but that
at the end of the repayment plan, the loan will still be in default or move into
foreclosure. Berry, supra note 78.
82. For an excellent explanation of the role of securitization in the growth of
predatory lending, S<'t' Engel & McCoy, supra note 53; l'etcrson, supra note 53.
83. For an expl.o1nation of how being a holder in due course protects inves
tors from litigation, see Engel & McCoy, supra not<' 53, at 2053.
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85. Kurt Eggert, Role of Secuntization in Subprirne Mortgage Market Turmoil,
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86. 24C.F.R. §4001.05.
87. Kate Berry, Refi-Program Previewers Raise ls~ues, AM. BANKER, Aug. 19,
2008, at 1.
88. There have been numerous legislative efforts to insulate servicers from
investor litigation if those servicers engage in widespread loan modifications.
For instance, H.B ..'i579 propos!Cd to create a safe harbor for creditors, assignees,
servicers, and securitizers of residentiJl mortgages engaging in widespread
loan modifications. The legislation is not likely to be enacted. Mortgage Rankers
Association Vice Chairman Story Testifies on Ernergency Mortgage Loan Modification
Act of 2008 Before Housr Panel, U.S. 1'£LJ. .\J£\VS, Apr. 15, 2008. The Emergency
Loan Modification Act of 2007, introduced by !<!ep. Hrad Miller, also sought to
protect scrvicers and banks from litigation if tht;>y pursued loan modifications.
89. [n ]('achers Insurance & Annuity Ass'n of America v. Criimi Mae Services,
2007 U.S. !)isl. LEXIS 28279 (S.D.l\(Y. Mar. 20, 2007), the court was confronted
with both a breach of fiduciary duty claim and a breach of contract claim by
investors in commercial mortgage-backed securities. !"he investors were parties
to the pooling and servicing agrePmt;>nt and held certificates that entitled them
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investors alleged that the servicer (and its affiliates) breached their contractual
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balance, the servicer is giving away the investoro.' money, not its own." Harry
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